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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

STATE OF UTAH,
PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT,
: NOT INCARCERATED
v.
MITCHELL WORWOOD,

Case No. 20060048-SC

DEFENDANT/PETITIONER.

REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER
On Writ of Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
State v. Worwood, 2005 UT App 539, a published opinion, by its plain language
authorizes law enforcement to unnecessarily take a suspect into custody without probable
cause, even for the reason than an officer simply does not want to be bothered with
constitutional requirements. The court's opinion expands the permissible scope of a level
2 detention beyond what is necessary and the least intrusive means available. Therefore,
the opinion does not merely push the limits of search and seizure law, it abandons it.
The State's claim that Worwood's state constitutional claim is improper is also
without merit. Not only did Worwood argue that the seizure violated his rights under the
Utah Constitution both in the district court and on direct appeal, but analysis under the
state provision is fairly encompassed within this appeal. Further, it is fully briefed.

ARGUMENT
L

THE STATE DELIBERATELY IGNORES THE UNDISPUTED RECORD
EVIDENCE THAT WORWOOD WAS UNNECESSARILY SEIZED
WITHOUT PROBABLE CAUSE.
The State's brief does not address either the proper standard of review or the

holding below. This Court reviews the court of appeals' decision for correctness. State v.
Rynhart, 2005 UT 84, ^9. The Utah Court of Appeals concluded that during a level two
investigative detention, it is reasonable for an officer (1) to seize a defendant without
probable cause, and (2) to detain him longer than is necessary to effectuate the purposes
of the stop. State v. Worwood, 2005 UT App 539. This decision is incorrect.
The court of appeals did not find that Trooper Wright had probable cause to seize
Worwood when he decided to transport him to Wright's personal residence. Worwood
was seized before field sobriety tests were given because the officer did not "want to"
conduct the tests at the stop (R92:10-16). Therefore, Worwood was seized without
probable cause. The State simply chooses to ignore this undisputed evidence. See, BRIEF
OF RESPONDENT ("Br. Resp.") 20-31. The State also ignores the court of appeals'
holding that it is reasonable for an officer to detain a defendant longer than is necessary to
effectuate the purposes of a stop, and the case law that contradicts it.1

1

"Although Trooper Wright may have been able to perform a sufficient field
sobriety test on Worwood at the point of the initial encounter in Deep Canyon and
possibly to transport him to the Juab County Jail, it was not unreasonable for him to drive
Worwood to a nearby location in the town to permit an on-duty officer to perform a field
sobriety test and, if necessary, effect a formal arrest." State v. Worwood, 2005 UT App
2

The State also fails to address the court of appeals' erroneous conclusion that "the
record gives no indication that under these unique circumstances Trooper Wright was
motivated by any purpose other than quickly and effectively resolving his suspicion that
Worwoodwas intoxicated." Id. The record gives plenty of indication that Wright's
motivation had nothing to do with resolving his suspicions quickly and effectively. As
Trooper Wright himself explained when asked why he did not perform field sobriety tests
at the stop, "I didn't want to", "it would have messed up my night", "it would have been
my arrest" (R92:10-ll, 14, 16).2
As Justice Thorne pointed out in his dissent, "The only competent evidence of the
events surrounding Worwood's encounter with Wright was Wright's testimony at the
suppression hearing.... Wright testified that he could have performed field sobriety tests
at the scene of the initial encounter, but chose not to for the sole reason of personal
convenience. The resulting increase in both the scope and the duration of Worwood's
539, f 9.
2

The State makes much of its claim that Worwood did not formally challenge the
trial court's clearly erroneous findings that Trooper Wright smelled alcohol before taking
Worwood into custody and that the officer's personal residence was a "safer" location to
perform field sobriety tests. Notwithstanding that the State's argument completely
ignores the evidence, Worwood's detailed recitation of that evidence {see, e.g., Statement
of Facts, BRIEF OF PETITIONER ("Br. Petr.")), the fact that Worwood's entire argument
both below and in this Court refutes the trial court's clearly erroneous findings, and even
the court of appeals' acknowledgment that the officer could have conducted field sobriety
tests at the initial encounter {see, fn. 1, supra), the State cannot change the facts in this
case by simply ignoring them. Moreover, if bloodshot eyes, slurred speech, and the odor
of alcohol (which was not a factor at the time of seizure) were sufficient standing alone to
justify arrest, field sobriety tests would become unnecessary and obsolete.
3

detention were therefore unnecessary and exceeded the legal boundaries of an otherwise
legitimate level two stop." State v. Worwood, 2005 UT App 539,ffi[14,16.
The State further argues that Trooper Wright's subjective motivation (i.e., "I didn't
want to") for not performing field sobriety tests at the scene of the stop is not relevant.
Br. Resp. 32.3 Worwood agrees that the officer's subjective intent in an otherwise valid
arrest is not particularly important. See, State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196, 1206 (Utah
1995) (explaining that the validity of an arrest must be analyzed objectively rather than on
the officer's subjective motivations). However, the seizure of Worwood in this case was
unlawful. Moreover, while Worwood appreciates the case law cited by the State in
support of its argument, it is not relevant to the question of whether Worwood was
detained longer than was necessary to effectuate the purposes of the stop, which hinges
directly on why he was taken into custody in the first place.4
The detention of Worwood was either necessary, or it was not. Regardless of what
'But c.f, State v. Warren, 2003 UT 36, ^[20, 78 P.3d 590 ("Though an officer's
subjective belief alone is insufficient to validate or invalidate a Terry frisk, to completely
disregard an officer's subjective belief excludes a potentially important element of the
analysis. . . .the United States Supreme Court appears to recognize that subjective belief
may be one of the factors in determining the reasonableness of an officer's decision to
perform a Terry frisk").
4

State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 1987) (per curiam) ("detention must
be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop")
(citations and quotations omitted); Salt Lake City v. Ray, 2000 UT App 55, P10 (same);
State v. Chism, 2005 UT App 41, ^[12 ("Officers must diligently pursue a means of
investigation that is likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, and it is unlawful
to continue the detention after reasonable suspicion is dispelled.") (citations and
quotations omitted).
4

Trooper Wright's subjective motivations were, by his own testimony he could have
performed the tests at the initial encounter (R92:10-16). Therefore, the undisputed
evidence proves that Wright's actions were not necessary. Id.5 The court of appeals
acknowledges this record fact. See, fn. 1, supra.
Thus, the court of appeals' decision in this case has lowered the standard in search
and seizure law from what is necessary to what is unnecessary. Convenience is the
standard. Therefore, during a level two encounter, now officers must only pursue a
means of investigation likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions eventually, the "least
intrusive means available" is no longer a benchmark,6 and a detention may or may not be
temporary and may last longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.
Contra, Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229, 103 S. Ct. 1319 (1983)
(plurality opinion) ("an investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than
is necessary to effectuate the purposes of the stop . . . investigative methods employed

5

The officer's conduct in this case did not merely violate state and federal
constitutional prohibitions against unlawful search and seizure. It was unwise. Under
color of state authority, Worwood's truck was seized and given to a "kid" to drive out of a
canyon (R92:4, 10). There was no inventory search done to protect either the state
against false claims or Worwood against property loss. Of more concern is the
transporting of Worwood to the officer's private residence in an unmarked vehicle. As
Justice Thorne noted in his dissent, "If the officer was an imposter, discomfort could
escalate into grave danger. I do not believe that this is the sort of scenario that we wish to
encourage by excusing Wright's actions in this case." State v. Worwood, 2005 UT App
539, fn. 2 (Thorne, J., dissenting).
6

The State seems to concur that the "least intrusive means reasonably available"
standard should be made obsolete, if it isn't already. Br. Resp. 24-5.
5

should be the least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer's
suspicion"); State v. Deitrnan, 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 1987) (per curiam); Salt Lake
City v. Ray, 2000 UT App 55, P10; State v. Chisrn, 2005 UT App 41, f 12. In short, the
court of appeals has bypassed the slippery slope of diminishing protections against
unlawful search and seizure and jumped straight to the bottom.
Worwood was unnecessarily seized in this case without probable cause.7 The
court of appeals' sanction of the officer's improper and unsafe conduct completely erodes
state and federal constitutional protections against unlawful search and seizure, and
creates an anomaly in search and seizure jurisprudence. Accordingly, the court of appeals
decision should be reversed and Worwood's conviction should be vacated.
II.

WORWOOD'S STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIM IS FAIRLY
ENCOMPASSED WITHIN THIS APPEAL.
Both the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 14 are fairly encompassed

within the scope of this Court's Order granting Worwood's petition.8

This Court did not

limit analysis to either article I, section 14 or to the Fourth Amendment, and both
provisions were included in Worwood's petition and are fairly encompassed by the issue.
7

Worwood already argued in his opening brief that the evidence obtained in this
case was a result of the unlawful seizure and fruit of the poisonous tree. Br. Petr. 12.
Since the State has not raised any arguments not anticipated by Worwood's arguments,
they are incorporated herein by reference.
8

"Whether delay in the performance of a field sobriety test and transportation of a
suspect may be justified by the inability of an officer to immediately effectuate a formal
arrest or by the existence of more suitable circumstances for performing the test at
another location." Order granting Worwood's Petition.
6

Notwithstanding the fact that the search and seizure were unlawful under the Fourth
Amendment, to fully resolve this Court's question as set forth in its Order granting
certiorari, it must be analyzed under article I, section 14.
In determining how article I, section 14 differs from the Fourth Amendment, it is
first necessary to reiterate that as applied to the evidence in this case, the officer's acts
constituted a violation of the lesser protections of the Fourth Amendment because the
extended detention was in no way necessary or the least intrusive means available. The
state law analysis, therefore, is most pertinent to the question of whether the permissible
scope of an investigative detention is defined by what is necessary and the least intrusive
means available, or by what is convenient or "more suitable."
This Court broadened the analysis in this case when it granted certiorari on the
question of whether it was reasonable for an officer to transport a defendant to a more
suitable location during a level two investigative encounter. There was no evidence that
the scene of the stop was unsuitable - or that the officer's private residence was more
suitable, for that matter. Therefore, Worwood never argued this issue in either the trial
court or on appeal. Worwood did argue that because the only evidence in this case clearly
established that the transportation was unnecessary, the officer exceeded the permissible
scope of an investigative detention. See, Br. Appt. And as noted above, the court of
appeals concluded that the officer's conduct was not unreasonable even though he could
have performed field sobriety tests at the stop. Fn. 1, supra.

7

While Worwood firmly reiterates his position that the officer's conduct in this case
was in clear violation of the Fourth Amendment, that fact does not render application of
article I, section 14 to this case in any way superfluous. And Worwood believes this issue
is not only preserved, but is fairly encompassed within this Court's grant of certiorari.
The State relies on Debry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428 (Utah 1995), as support for its
argument that Worwood's state constitutional claim is not properly before this Court (Br.
Resp. at 10-11). However, in Debry, the litigants raised entirely new claims they had
never raised below, and this Court refused to consider those claims stating that litigants
could only argue on appeal issues "fairly encompassed" in the grant of the petition. Id. at
443. This case is very different from Debry.
Worwood's fundamental claim that the search and seizure were unlawful has not
changed. Worwood consistently made the same claim in the district court, in the Utah
Court of Appeals, and in this Court. Additionally, the State concedes that in every
proceeding, Worwood claimed the search and seizure violated both the Fourth
Amendment and article I, section 14. See, Br. Resp. 9-11. Moreover, the scope of this
Court's grant of Worwood's petition encompasses the lawfulness of a seizure without
probable cause. See, Order granting petition. Unlike Debry, Worwood is not arguing for
the first time that his First Amendment or due process rights were violated, for example.
The State's reliance on State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1988), is similarly
misplaced. Br. Resp. at 11. In Lafferty, this Court refused to address the appellant's state

8

constitutional claims, noting that the appellant only "nominally relied" on state
constitutional provisions. Id. at 1247, n. 5. In contrast, Worwood presented a separate
and lengthy analysis of this case under article I, section 14 in his opening brief. See,
BRIEF OF PETITIONER ("Br. Petr."), 6-12.
As alluded to above, the State's additional argument that Worwood9s state law
claim is inadequately briefed is particularly puzzling in light of the 6 pages of separate
analysis in Worwood's opening brief.9 See, Br. Petr. 6-12. See also, Midvale City Corp.
v. Haltom, 2003 UT 26, ^[74, 73 P.3d 334 ("For the court to consider a state constitutional
claim, a litigant must at least define the nature of that protection and provide some
argument as to how legal precedent supports its position"). Notably, the State spends 12
pages arguing that Worwood's state law claim is inadequately briefed and improper. If
indeed Worwood's brief is so lacking and "includes no reasoned application of article I,
section 14 to the factual record" (Br. Resp. 17), the State dedicated an inordinate amount
of space to the issue. However, the State's contention is without merit.
While there is somewhat limited guidance in Utah on how interpretation of article
I, section 14 varies from its federal counterpart, this Court has clearly affirmed that the
state provision is more protective. See, Brigham City v. Stuart, 2005 UT 13, ^}11-14, 122

9

The State also makes much of its claim that Worwood does not heavily cite the
text of article I, section 14 in his opening brief. Br. Resp. 17. This argument is
somewhat disingenuous. As the State and this Court no doubt are aware, the text of both
article I, section 14 and the Fourth Amendment is virtually identical. It is in their
respective applications that they differ.
9

P.3d 506, rev yd on other grounds, No. 05-502 (also regretting that petitioners' lack of
analysis under article I, section 14 might create "a de facto abdication of [this Court's]
responsibility as guardians of the individual liberty of our citizens").
The State's own arguments demonstrate the compelling need for the application of
state law to this increasingly complex and vacillating issue. Under a Fourth Amendment
analysis, some courts have determined that the permissible scope of an investigative
detention is not exceeded when a suspect is transported or otherwise moved to another
location (Br. Resp. 28-30). While not binding, these cases cited by the State only
underscore this Court's expressed concerns that Fourth Amendment protections are in
flux and rapidly shrinking.10
To create consistency in the law and greater protections against unlawful search
and seizure (Br. Petr. 8), under article I, section 14 the permissible parameters of an
investigative detention must be defined at a minimum by what is necessary and the least
intrusive means available, not by the nebulous and inherently subjective "more suitable"
standard, and not by fluctuating and therefore unpredictable definition of "reasonable."

10

The State minimizes U.S. Supreme Court precedent to the contrary. Br. Resp.
24-5. Moreover, the State simply does not acknowledge decisions from this Court also
holding contrary to the irrelevant cases it cites. See, e.g., State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125,
TJ36, 63 P.3d 650 ("A level three encounter involves an arrest, which has been
characterized as a highly intrusive or lengthy detention that requires probable cause.")
(quotations and citations omitted); State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 1987)
(per curiam) ("the [investigative] detention must be temporary and last no longer than is
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop") (citations and quotations omitted).
10

A nd while the State argues that an officer's subjective motivations have no relevance to
the reasonableness of a detention, the vagueness of the "more suitable" standard that the
State supports necessarily removes objectivity and shifts the analysis to a subjective one.
Thus, while transporting a suspect to a "more suitable" location during a level two
investigative detenlion has been held in some courts cited by the State to be acceptable
under the Fourth Amendment, it is not acceptable under the more protective provisions of
the Utah Constitution. Adopting such an indefinite standard will only add to the existing
confusion and complexity of search and seizure jurisprudence.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing facts and law, Worwood respectively asks this Court to
vacate the district court's denial of Worwood's motion to suppress and thereby vacate
Worwood's conviction.
Respectful!} >uhmiued this IA> day of June, 2006.
FILLMORE SPENCER, LLC

wtu$^

Scott Card/Jennifer Gewans
Attorneys for Mr. Worwood
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